Geofence Warrants After Chatrie: What the Supreme Court Decided—and What It Did Not

A traditional search warrant usually begins with a known person, device, vehicle, or location. A geofence warrant can work in the opposite direction. Investigators identify a geographic area and a period of time, then seek device-location information to determine who may have been present.

The process used in Chatrie had three stages:

1. Google supplied anonymized location data for devices within the designated area and time.
2. Investigators selected some anonymized devices for additional location information covering a longer period and locations outside the original boundary.
3. Investigators requested identifying subscriber information for a smaller group of devices.

This investigative structure can be powerful because it may identify a suspect when police do not yet have a name. It also creates constitutional concerns because information from people who are not suspected of wrongdoing may be swept into the initial data return.

The case arose from a 2019 armed robbery at a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. Witness information and surveillance footage indicated that the robber appeared to use a cellphone as he approached the credit union.

Police obtained a warrant directed to Google for a circular area with a radius of 150 meters around the credit union. The initial request covered one hour—30 minutes before and 30 minutes after the robbery.

According to the Supreme Court’s opinion, Google initially returned anonymized data for 19 users. Investigators narrowed the group to nine devices for expanded movement data and ultimately requested identifying information for three users. One was Okello Chatrie.

Chatrie moved to suppress the evidence. The district court concluded that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but admitted the evidence under the good-faith exception. The Fourth Circuit reached the result through differing reasoning, including a conclusion that Chatrie lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information.

The Supreme Court held that obtaining Chatrie’s Google Location History was a search under the Fourth Amendment because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cellphone-location information.

The Court rejected the idea that a person necessarily surrenders that privacy interest simply because a technology company holds the information. Its analysis built upon earlier digital-privacy decisions recognizing that detailed location records can reveal intimate patterns of a person’s life.

This means law enforcement’s acquisition of this type of location information is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Describing the data as belonging to a third-party provider does not end the constitutional analysis.

The Court did not decide whether the multi-step warrant in Chatrie was reasonable. Specifically, it left the Fourth Circuit to determine whether each stage satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity.

That distinction is essential. The decision should not be summarized as “the Supreme Court banned geofence warrants.” It did not.

The accurate takeaway is:

• Obtaining an individual’s Google Location History through this process is a Fourth Amendment search.
• Courts must examine whether the warrant properly authorized the search.
• The constitutionality of the warrant’s scope, narrowing procedures, and successive disclosures remains a separate inquiry.

The Court also did not decide whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence.

In a digital-evidence case, reviewing the face of the warrant is only the beginning. Counsel may also need to reconstruct how the warrant was actually executed.

Important questions include:

• What technology and database produced the location information?
• What geographic boundary and time period did the warrant authorize?
• How many uninvolved devices appeared in the initial return?
• What objective criteria were used to narrow the device list?
• Did later stages expand the time period or move beyond the original geographic boundary?
• Did investigators obtain additional judicial authorization before requesting broader or identifying information?
• What information was retained about people who were eliminated from consideration?
• How was the location data corroborated with witness statements, video, records, or physical evidence?
• Did investigators treat location data as an investigative lead or overstate it as proof of identity or conduct?

These questions are relevant to probable cause, particularity, minimization, investigative bias, discovery, and the reliability of conclusions drawn from digital records.

Not directly.

Automated license-plate readers and geofence warrants can both generate location information, but they involve different technologies, data sources, collection practices, retention rules, and legal processes. Chatrie concerned Google Location History obtained through a particular multi-step geofence procedure.

The decision may inform broader arguments about technologically enabled location surveillance, but it should not be treated as an automatic ruling on Flock Safety cameras, other automated license-plate-reader systems, cell-tower dumps, private-investigator databases, or every form of commercial location data.

Each system requires its own factual and legal analysis.

Digital evidence does not evaluate itself. A meaningful review examines the technology, warrant language, execution process, investigative decisions, documentation, corroboration, and the limits placed on the conclusions.

Christine Burke is a former police sergeant, major-case detective, licensed private investigator, and court-qualified law-enforcement expert witness. She reviews police policy, procedure, investigative decision-making, digital evidence practices, and forensic genetic genealogy for criminal and civil matters.

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This article provides educational information and is not legal advice. The application of Fourth Amendment law depends on the facts, jurisdiction, procedural posture, and governing authority in each case.